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Chapter 5 
Oppression and Resistance in Post-Colonial Iraq 
[T]he artificially-imposed discourses and institutions of constitutional 
monarchy, elitist ideology, and especially Saddam’s brand of Baathism have 
historically fought so hard to take root in the Iraqi cultural sensibilities that 
they provoked a heterogeneous counter-culture of resistance. (Al-Musawi 
2006: 8) 
Re-thinking Post-Colonial Iraq 
The Revolution of 1958 marked a fundamental turn in Iraqi politics. It saw the nation proceed 
from the Colonialism of the British and the hegemony of their installed Hashemite monarchy 
towards the emergence of a Post-Colonial Iraq (1958–2003). It also saw the emergence of 
various Post-Colonial political discourses which seemed to carry with them the promise of a 
new Iraq. Clearly, however, there were a number of competing visions of what this new Iraq 
should look like. While the events of the revolution and the important political schisms which 
followed are addressed later in this chapter, it is critical to note here that while Post-Colonial 
Iraq made many initial steps towards a more equitable and democratic life, most of this period is 
characterized by the ascension of a number of repressive regimes culminating in the rise of the 
Baath party and the self-elected presidency of Saddam Hussein. 
While the Iraqi people suffered under the weight of these oppressive regimes, in the West 
the rule of several Iraqi dictators, but especially Saddam Hussein, fitted very neatly with already 
existing notions of Oriental despotism. This was especially true during times of conflict such as 
the Gulf War of 1991 during which Saddam was painted as an evil madman, likened to Hitler 
and compared to the megalomaniacal and bloodthirsty kings of the ancient Near East (Keeble 
1998, Philo and McLaughlin 1995, Toth 1992). He was dubbed ‘The Beast of Baghdad’ as 
‘Countless stories were needlessly repeated throughout the mainstream media of his brutality … 
[while] Tabloid magazines published sensational stories detailing his alleged sexual crimes and 
perversions’ (Kellner 1995: 208). This continued throughout the 1990s, especially when 
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Saddam violated various UN restrictions and Iraq was subsequently subjected to missile strikes 
by the United States, Britain and France in 1993 and again in 1998 (Richardson 2004: 157–71). 
By focusing on the desire to punish the Oriental despot, the press were able to evoke ‘an 
imperialist and indeed racist ideology of relations between nations, which contributes to the 
continuity of imperialist and neo-Colonialist relations in practice’ (Fairclough 1995: 102). 
While the events of September 11 2001 are not the focus here, it is worth noting that they 
provided the US Administration with clear evidence that the fundamental paradigm 
underpinning relations between the West and the Orient was a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
(Tomanic-Trivundza 2004: 480). This is perhaps best evidenced by US President George W. 
Bush’s declaration of a ‘War on Terror’ – a clear interpretative framework that enabled him to 
contrast what he saw as the righteous forces of the West against the terrorizing hordes of the 
non-Western world. As part of the War on Terror, the US government began building their case 
to attack Iraq based on two central allegations that were later proven so abjectly false: that 
Saddam supported terrorism and had links to Al-Qaeda, and that he was harbouring Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD), which he was likely to use or supply to others. This assertion 
became especially clear in President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address, which focused 
much of its attention on Iraq. Towards the end of the speech, the President claimed that 
Before 11 September 2001, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein 
could be contained. But chemical agents and lethal viruses and shadowy 
terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with 
other weapons, and other plans – this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It 
would take just one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to 
bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in 
our power to make sure that day never comes. (Bush 2003d) 
The Western mainstream media began beating the drums of war. They painted a typically 
Orientalist picture of Iraqis as degenerate, primitive and untrustworthy, yet cunning and vicious 
(Brown 2006: 105). As Said noted in an essay published in the lead up to the war, this one-eyed 
view of Iraq enabled ‘the dehumanization of the hated “other”’ by reducing their ‘existence to a 
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few insistently repeated simple phrases, images, and concepts. This makes it easier to bomb the 
enemy without qualm’ (Said 2004 [2002]: 217). It also helped to assure Western audiences that 
the war was legitimate and, more problematically, it ‘drew on an imagined and vaguely racist 
legacy of the way “the West” has historically positioned itself as being responsible for 
“civilizing the world”’ (Richardson 2007: 191). 
Central to all of this was the demonization of Saddam. Familiar stories re-emerged as 
Western media audiences were bombarded with images and articles about his many wives and 
lovers, his blood-lust and his brutal political strategies. More bizarrely, the media took a 
peculiar interest in the number of surgically-enhanced body-doubles Saddam apparently had 
scattered across the country, his sexual perversions, the excessive decadence of his palaces and 
the endless catacombs and bomb-shelters that would protect him from even the most deadly air 
raids (Paz and Aviles 2009). The crimes of his sons, Udday and Qusay, were dutifully recounted 
while others focused on Saddam’s alleged tendency to have anyone executed who dared to 
challenge his authority or question his motives. In this way, the image of Saddam Hussein and 
his regime fitted well with the age-old discourse of Oriental despotism. Like the excesses and 
brutality of the Persian kings and other Asiatic despots found in the work of Montesquieu and 
Chardin for example, Saddam’s despotism was that of arbitrary power exerted over an unwilling 
and terrified populace. 
For scholars such as Kanan Makiya, the tyranny of the Baath is indicative of the broader 
failings of the Iraqi people themselves who, along with all Arabs, had not grasped notions of 
modernity, liberty, equality and justice (Makiya 1998 [1989]). This is made explicit in his 
Cruelty and Silence in which he claims that 
Men like Saddam Hussein … are indigenous creations of modern Arab 
political culture, which until now has failed to produce anything better … 
[Arabs] have failed to evolve a genuinely convincing language of rights in 
politics … [They] have become fossilized, backward-looking and steeped in a 
romanticism of ‘struggle’ which is conducive to violence … [They must] 
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begin to realize that they are overwhelmingly responsible for the deplorable 
state of their world. (Makiya 1993: 282) 
Taking such notions even further, Said Aburish opens his work Saddam Hussein: The Politics of 
Revenge by connecting the rule of Saddam to Iraqi history. In a few short pages, he reduces 
thousands of years of Iraq’s complex political past down to a lineage of blood-thirsty and 
dictatorial regimes. For him, the rise of Saddam 
has to be understood in the context of the history of Iraq … Saddam as an 
individual may be unique, even demonic, but he is also a true son of Iraq. 
Even his use of violence to achieve his aims is not a strictly personal 
characteristic, but rather an unattractive trait of the Iraqi people reinforced by 
their history … [and] the violence and cruelty which accompanied every 
change in the governance of the country throughout its history … [Together] 
the turbulent history, harsh environment and multi-stranded culture of Iraq 
have produced a complex and unique conglomerate which lacks the 
ingredients for creating a homogenous country and a commitment to the idea 
of a national community. (Aburish 2000: 1–3) 
Aside from their assertion that a culture of unchanging authoritarianism was a product 
of the failings of the Iraqi people throughout history, such works develop and promulgate a 
remarkably one-eyed view of the Post-Colonial era in Iraq. It is important to acknowledge from 
the start that while this chapter does offer a more nuanced view of the Post-Colonial period, it is 
no way a defence of the tyranny of the Baath and the brutal megalomania of Saddam. 
Specifically, the first section examines the quashing of Iraq’s civil society and the tight 
restraints exerted over the nation’s media throughout the period. It also addresses the ways in 
which various Post-Colonial regimes, but especially the Baath, were adept at manipulating the 
discourses of democracy in order to mask their tyranny and coerce people into patriotism. 
Moving beyond this, however, the second section documents the various clandestine opposition 
groups that began to emerge across Iraq’s divergent ethno-religious and political divides who 
resisted Baathist oppression and agitated for democratic change. They produced their own 
media outlets which proved effective in voicing the various frustrations and grievances of Iraqis 
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of all backgrounds and shades of opinion, giving way to a renewed public sphere.1 The Post-
Colonial era, therefore, alternative history of Iraq from the mid-twentieth through to the early 
twenty-first century in which one finds a sophisticated political culture deeply concerned with 
the issue of democratic governance. 
State Propaganda and the Discourses of Democracy 
As far back as 1951 the fledgling Arab Baath Socialist Party (Hizb Al-Baath Al-Arabi Al-
Ishtiraki)2 had been gathering momentum in the Iraqi armed forces. Although Baathist ideology 
developed in Damascus around 1940, it emigrated to Iraq in 1949 and developed a loyal 
following in Iraq under the leadership of Faud Al-Rikabi, a young Iraqi engineer from Nasiriyya 
(Baram 1991: 9–13). The early message of the Baath in Iraq was relatively similar to Post-
Colonial movements elsewhere: Iraq and the broader Arab region would never reach their 
potential in the modern world if they continued to suffer the inequities and suppression of 
foreign occupation. Disseminated via Baathist organs such as Al-Hurriya (‘The Freedom’), Al-
Afkar (‘The Idea’) and, their later subsidiary, Al-Amal (‘The Labour’), this message 
understandably appealed to many Iraqis, particularly members of the military and the 
intelligentsia, who were yet to experience total independence from the British occupation and its 
installed Hashemite monarchy (Davis 2005b: 96). By 1952 a number of Baathist-leaning cells 
within the military had emerged, constituting the ‘Free Officers’ movement, and these were 
later inspired and somewhat radicalized in a series of major steps taken by Gamal Abdul Nasser 
in Egypt towards his vision of the ‘United Arab Republic’ (Stansfield 2007: 92). 
Among the more influential converts to the early doctrine of the Baath were two of Iraq’s 
most senior military officers, Brigadier General Abdul Karim Qasim and Colonel Abdus-Salam 
                                                 
1 Earlier work by the author includes a set of detailed tables that document the most significant media outlets of Post-
Colonial Iraq, both those controlled by the state and by the various political and ethno-religious opposition 
movements (Isakhan 2009a: 251-6). 
2 Baath translates to mean ‘Awakening’, ‘Renaissance’ or ‘Renewal’ and the party will henceforth be termed the 
Baath or ABSP. 
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Arif (Tripp 2000: 144). Together, the forces loyal to these two men had gathered enough 
momentum to storm Baghdad on 14 July 1958, seizing control of key government buildings, 
including the national radio station and the royal palace. While Arif used the radio to announce, 
‘Citizens of Baghdad, the Monarchy is dead! The Republic is here!’ (Arif cited in Mackey 
2002: 157), his soldiers fulfilled his pronouncement by murdering all but one member of the 
royal family. The bodies of the Regent Abd Al-Ilah and the young King Faisal II were promptly 
sequestered by the angry civilian mob that had followed the military into the palace and dragged 
through the streets of Baghdad. The next day the body of the newly-deposed Prime Minister, 
Nuri Al-Said, was seized by another mob after he was discovered trying to flee Iraq dressed as a 
woman (Dawisha 2009: 171–2). 
The revolutionaries were not a homogenous entity, however. They represented a 
fundamental schism which had long split secular Iraqi political movements into two main 
camps: those supporting the more left-wing Qasim who had garnered the support of much of the 
military and the members of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) under the loose ideology of Iraqi 
nationalism; while others followed Arif who adhered to more of a Pan-Arab approach, attracting 
the orthodox members of the emerging Baathist movement (Fernea and Louis 1991). Given 
Qasim’s superior rank and broader initial support, he was the natural heir to the events of the 
coup d’état and he quickly established a series of lofty goals for his incumbency, including his 
desire to 
increase and distribute the national wealth … to found a new society and a 
new democracy, to use this strong, democratic, Arabist Iraq as an instrument 
to free and elevate other Arabs and Afro-Asians and to assist the destruction 
of ‘imperialism’, by which he largely meant British influence in the 
underdeveloped countries. (Curtis 2004: 82) 
While such goals were never fully realized, Qasim’s leadership did foster the development of a 
nascent public sphere made up of a myriad of political parties, professional associations, labour 
movements and intellectual groups who fervently debated the political events and ideologies of 
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their time. Qasim also oversaw the formation of the Sovereignty Council (Majlis Siyadat Al-
Thawra) and the Iraqi cabinet and he took unprecedented steps to counter Iraqi sectarianism and 
sexism, including the involvement of Shias, Kurds, other ethnic and religious minorities and 
women at various levels of government (Davis 2005b: 116–9). This diverse political climate 
was also reflected in the Iraqi media sector where the heavily partisan newspapers of Iraq 
generally enjoyed considerable autonomy and popularity. The early 1960s saw an upsurge in 
newspaper production across Iraq, with over 20 in Baghdad alone. Approximately one-third of 
these Baghdad papers had pro-Communist tendencies, including the re-launched Ittihad Al-
Ummal (‘The Worker’s Union’) as Wahdat Al-Ummal (‘The Worker’s Unity’) in 1962 and, in 
1963, the re-appearance of Sawt Al-Furat (‘The Voice of the Euphrates’) (Batatu,1982 [1978]: 
35, Rugh 2004: 46–7). With the arrival of television sets in a number of coffeehouses following 
the 1958 Revolution, the illiterate and poor Iraqi majority gained a new insight into the 
machinations of politics, both domestic and international. While Qasim initially used this new 
medium to broadcast the trials of corrupt members of the former regime, the television later 
became a format to continue the work of countering sectarianism and to encourage national 
unity (Tripp 2007: 45). 
However, Qasim was ultimately undermined by his inability to form effective alliances 
with his own power base in the ICP and the NDP, as well as by his failure to realize the 
importance of Pan-Arab ideology to many Iraqi citizens. This created something of a power 
vacuum in which the disgruntled members of the ABSP were able to gather significant 
momentum with their vision of a strong Iraq as the leader of a new Pan-Arab alliance. The 
ABSP repeatedly tried to assassinate Qasim; in 1959 the first attempt involved a young and 
relatively unknown Baathist by the name of Saddam Hussein. Eventually, the ABSP was able to 
once again establish loyal cells in the Iraqi army and on 8 February 1963 they seized Baghdad. 
General Qasim was executed the following day and the image of his body, lying prostrate in a 
pool of his own blood, was beamed out across Iraq on state television. It appears that the 
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Baathists had also learned the political power of the television and it was Qasim’s final 
appearance on Iraqi TV which was to be his most memorable. 
The first ABSP government of Iraq was thus formed in 1963 under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Hasan Al-Bakr with Qasim’s partner in the 1958 coup, Colonel Arif, installed as 
President. In events that served as something of a preamble to the tyrannical rule of Saddam 
Hussein, the Baath Party promptly set about utilizing their newfound powers to imprison, 
torture and execute what was left of Iraq’s nascent opposition movements, especially their long-
time foes in the ICP (Stansfield 2007: 93–4). The power of the ABSP was short-lived, however. 
By the end of the same year, Arif had arrested many of the senior members of the Baath and 
announced that the military would henceforth be administering the affairs of the state (Goode 
1975: 107). In terms of political developments, the events of 1963 – the violent disposal of 
Qasim, the purge of Iraqi opposition by the Baath and the ascension of the military under Arif – 
signified the real beginning of authoritarianism in Iraq (Haj, 1997). This trend was to continue 
after Arif was killed in a helicopter accident in 1966 and his brother, Abdur-Rahman Arif, 
succeeded him (Batatu 1982 [1978]: 1027–72). Throughout their reign, the Arif brothers also 
enacted a series of restrictive press laws including Press Law No. 53 which imposed heavy 
censorship on the press and the tight control of media licences. 
The political climate fostered under the consecutive regimes of the Arif brothers did little 
to encourage the establishment of moderate and legitimate political movements and arguably 
paved the way for the violent military coup d’etat in which the ABSP ascended to authority in 
1968 (Dawisha 2009: 183–9). This time Hasan Al-Bakr (now installed as President) made sure 
that once the military had served its purpose in overthrowing Arif, it would be purged of any 
potential threats to the new regime (Stansfield 2007: 94–5). A brief struggle for power between 
the two allies in the coup – the military and the Baath – broke out, with each of these bodies 
controlling one of the two major newspapers in Iraq at that time, Al-Thawra (‘The Revolution’) 
and Al-Jumhuriyya (‘The Republic’), respectively. This struggle for power was promptly 
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decided in favour of the Baath, and served as another valuable lesson for the party regarding the 
power of the press. 
They acted quickly. One of the Baath party’s first acts was to jail, charge and then 
execute Aziz Abdel Barakat who was both the head of the Journalist’s Union and the publisher 
of the independent Al-Manar (‘The Lighthouse’), one of the most professionally run and widely 
distributed dailies in Iraq at the time. Following this, in 1969 the Baath Party established a 
publications law which effectively made the media the fourth branch of the newly established 
government. This saw the Iraqi media industry quickly transform into one that was ‘more 
controlled, monolithic, mobilized and almost completely stripped of any critical approach’ 
(Bengio 2004: 110). This meant that by the early 1970s Iraq had only five daily newspapers, 
each of which was heavily influenced, if not completely controlled by the state. In addition to 
their own paper, Al-Jumhuriyah, they took control of Al-Thawrah and the English-language 
Baghdad Observer, and added the Kurdish language Taakhi (‘Brotherhood’) in 1969 and Tariq 
al Shab (‘The Path of the People’) in 1973 (Rugh 1979: 32). 
In terms of the Baath’s actual views on democracy, the proceedings of the Eighth 
National Conference of the ABSP in 1965, are particularly instructive. The party declared that: 
Popular democracy, as understood by the Baath, rises on complete voluntary 
mutual responsiveness that can materialize between the party and the masses 
once the party maintains an opening with them and abandons all air of 
superiority … From this it follows that there can be no room for 
contradictions between the party’s concepts and the concepts of the masses, 
but rather harmony and concurrence. (Program of the Arab Baath Socialist 
Party 1965: III) 
Here, the Baath cleverly invoked the notion of popular democracy while maintaining that such 
democracy can only work as long as it does not contradict the party’s agenda. To make sure that 
no such contradiction emerges, the conference proceedings state further that ‘The party might be 
compelled, especially in the early stages of the revolution, to feign terror and coercive guidance 
with the object of crushing the enemies of the revolution’ (Program of the Arab Baath Socialist 
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Party 1965: III). In terms of the freedom of the Iraqi public sphere to criticize the party, the 
Baath warn that while ‘the masses [have] the right of constructive criticism within the limits of 
the nation’s progressive line of destiny’ such criticism ‘cannot become an end in itself, nor can 
it be allowed to proceed unchecked to the limit of undermining the nationalist socialist line 
itself’ (Program of the Arab Baath Socialist Party 1965: III).3 
These ideas continued after the 1968 coup. From the very beginning of their ascendency 
the Baath sought to construct themselves as a force for democratic change in Iraq, their 1968 
constitution claiming the nation was now a ‘popular democratic state’ (Al-Jumhuriyya 1968). As 
far as Baathist official policy was concerned, their message to the people was that Baathist 
democracy was something far greater than Western models as it was not only more stable, but 
more in tune with Arab sentiment. This is particularly evident in the state press, where 
newspapers like Al-Thawra dutifully ran editorials that reinforced the Baathist vision of 
democracy, claiming that ‘the assumption that democracy means freedom of speech seems 
ridiculous to Iraqis’ (Al-Thawra, 1969). The same editorial goes on to claim that the 
interpretation of democracy to mean ‘the freedom of forming parties’ was a ‘bourgeois 
assumption’ and that ‘The socialist revolution and the rule of the one socialist party [the Baath] 
have made nonsense of this unbalanced assumption’ (Al-Thawra 1969).4 The Baath regularly 
used the media to wage attacks on Western liberal democracies while providing little in the way 
of rational critique or viable political alternatives. The Baath also utilized the press to 
differentiate themselves from their predecessors, employing the rhetoric of Oriental despotism 
to explain away the dictatorships of Qasim and the Arif brothers and contrasting them against an 
image of the Baath as the people’s champion against oppression (Bengio 1998: 64). 
                                                 
3 These translations are taken from Roy E. Thoman’s Iraq Under Baathist Rule (Thoman 1972: 32). 
4 The translations of Al-Jumhuriyya and Al-Thawra found in this paragraph are from Ofra Bengio’s Saddam’s Word 
(Bengio 1998: 57, 61). 
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Concurrently, the little known Saddam Hussein was fast developing a reputation as a 
ruthless politician and cunning strategist that belied his quiet and aloof nature and his humble 
rural background. Having played a relatively small but quite strategic role in the ascension of 
the ABSP to power in 1968, Saddam now dutifully laboured behind the scenes, brilliantly 
transforming the Baath from a nominal party to a nation-wide phenomenon (Tripp 2000: 195–
9). It is now well known that Saddam’s rise to power was marked by terror and coercion, that he 
went on to commit grievous crimes against his own citizens, especially the many religious and 
ethnic minorities of Iraq and that he was one of the cruellest and most tyrannical despots of 
modern times (Cordesman and Hashim 1997: 111–8). What is perhaps less well known is that 
Saddam was the master of a highly developed and multi-tiered propaganda machine. As has 
been shown in Chapters 2 and 3, he developed his own particular cult of personality by aligning 
himself with Iraq’s Mesopotamian and Islamic heritage. He also managed to build himself a 
reputation as a political revolutionary, a brilliant strategist, a paternal figure who cared deeply 
about his nation and a visionary who could lead Iraq – and indeed the entire Arab world – into a 
modern and prosperous future. He was a powerful and charismatic politician, wielding a 
rhetoric that appealed directly to the ‘everyday’ Iraqi. 
In this way, Saddam had garnered his own loyal following and when, in 1979, he 
pressured Bakr to stand-down Bakr had little choice but to abdicate the Presidency to his young 
protégé. Having witnessed firsthand the power of the media in the rise of the Baath Party to 
power a little over a decade earlier, Saddam was all too aware of the utility of the press and 
quickly set about modelling them after earlier totalitarian examples such as Nazi Germany and 
the Soviet Union (Bengio 2004: 110). Although the nation retained its five daily newspapers 
under Saddam’s rule, he was quick to quash any lingering notions of freedom of the press by 
making sure that the entire media industry came under the authority of the government and that 
every working journalist was an active member of the ABSP. This meant that each of Iraq’s 
papers soon became state-run propaganda machines, dutifully reciting official policy and 
praising governmental action. He ensured that this occurred through careful and clandestine 
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monitoring of the media as well as more banal and overt practices such as insisting that his 
photograph be featured daily on page one and that each of his speeches was printed in full. 
Saddam was also careful to prevent Iraqis from too much exposure to external media by 
periodically jamming news broadcasts from outside Iraq and imposing a five year prison 
sentence on anyone owning a satellite dish.  
Saddam was also keen to engineer a new image of himself as an enlightened and liberal-
minded leader, one familiar with sophisticated political models such as democracy. To do so, in 
the very earliest days of the regime he began creating an aura of radical political change: he 
allowed several communist works to be translated into Arabic, he wrote his own neo-Marxist 
editorials and he courted left-leaning intellectuals and activists, inviting them to play an active 
role in the new Iraq. By shoring up his revolutionary credentials amongst the left and the 
broader Iraqi community, Saddam was gradually able to shift debate towards the centralization 
of power. As he became increasingly powerful and dictatorial, Saddam was able to mirror 
earlier Baathist attempts to manufacture and manipulate a particular image of democracy that 
suited his own agenda and garnered support for his rule. To do this, Saddam argued that a 
forward looking Iraq must be centred around a government of ‘democratic centralization’, a 
term ultimately used to describe the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Baath (Dawisha 
2009: 228–31). Along these lines, the state media dutifully catalogued Saddam’s claim that ‘Our 
party has implemented democracy … drawing on noble and eternal sources and origins 
compatible with the conscience of the people’ (Al-Iraq 1979).5 In another speech, published in 
Al-Thawra under the headline ‘Democracy: A Source of Strength for the Individual and 
Society’, Saddam claimed that 
There is no contradiction between democracy and legitimate power. Let no 
one among you imagine the democracy weakens him, or robs him of his 
dignity and legitimate sphere of control. This is not true. According to the 
well-known balance between democracy and centralism, there is no 
                                                 
5 As translated in Bengio’s Saddam’s Word (Bengio 1998: 62). 
 13
contradiction between the practise of democracy and legitimate central 
control. Only those of poor understanding could imagine such a contradiction 
between guardianship and comradely dealings, or between preservation of role 
and the position of leadership. (Al-Thawra 1977)6 
To further promote his democratic credentials in 1980 and again in 1984, Saddam conducted 
Iraq’s first Post-Colonial elections for the National Assembly. These elections were designed to 
serve several key Baathist purposes. They helped to placate domestic Shia and Kurdish 
grievances and to provide a modern alternative to the rise of Shia theocratic power in Iran. They 
were also expressly designed to confirm Saddam’s alleged commitment to democratization, to 
garner consent for his war with Iran and, ultimately, to further re-affirm his empery over the 
Iraqi people. In his studies of these elections, Amatzia Baram documents the fierce competition 
that existed among the electoral candidates, who themselves came from a variety of different 
political and ethnic backgrounds, because winning a seat brought with it significant power, 
prestige and career prospects (Baram 1981, 1989). As Baram points out, throughout the 
elections the Iraqi media were critical in promoting the elections, in advocating and closely 
scrutinizing the policies and platforms of the different candidates and in reporting the results. In 
the lead up to the elections, around 1500 biographies of the candidates were published in the 
press, including demographic data as well as details about an individual’s revolutionary struggle 
and their length of membership and allegiance to the Baath. 
The results are particularly interesting. In both elections a significant proportion of Shia 
were elected (43% in 1980 and 46% in 1984), as well as smaller numbers of Kurds and women. 
This, coupled with the fact that the elected candidates had powers such as the ratification of the 
budget and international treaties, supervision of certain state institutions, and were apparently 
free to debate domestic and foreign policy issues, meant that the elections had at least achieved 
the guise of being democratic. In reality, however, the National Assembly was virtually 
powerless, being at the mercy of the highly centralized Revolutionary Command Council and 
                                                 
6 This translation is taken from Kanan Makiya’s Republic of Fear (Makiya 1998 [1989]: 80). 
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serving as little more than a rubber stamp for the policies of the state. In addition, Shia, Kurdish 
and female representatives rarely ascended the political ladder. Nonetheless, Saddam took great 
pride in these quasi-democratic moments, even appearing on Iraqi state television on the 
evening of the 1980 election making spontaneous visits to the homes of poor Iraqi families ‘to 
inquire whether they had voted in that day’s parliamentary elections’ (Davis 2005b: 237). 
Immediately after the Iran-Iraq War, however, Saddam was faced with thousands of men 
who, on returning from the frontline, found few employment opportunities awaiting them. Many 
of these citizens – particularly the already disenfranchized Shia and Kurds – began to revolt 
against Saddam’s authority and called for democratic reforms (Keeble 1997: 12). Surprisingly, 
Saddam reacted by co-ordinating further parliamentary elections in 1989, seemingly because he 
believed that some form of public debate over democracy would enable his citizens to voice 
their grievances without overwhelming his authority. Not taking any chances, however, Saddam 
implemented even tighter restrictions over these elections than their predecessors, requiring ‘all 
candidates to have contributed to the war against Iran and to believe that it had resounded to the 
glory of Iraq’ (Bengio 1998: 68). These elections enabled Saddam to label himself ‘the engineer 
of democracy’ or ‘the shepherd of democracy’ and to make public statements such as ‘All 
democracy to the people, all liberty to the people, all rights to the people’ (Al-Thawra 1989). 7 
Due to the economic cost (not to mention the military and civilian cost) incurred by the 
Iran-Iraq War, Saddam urgently needed funds. On 2 August 1990 he decided to invade Iraq’s 
oil-rich neighbour, Kuwait, which had long been viewed as little more than an outpost of Basra, 
unfairly cut off from Iraq first by the Ottomans and then by the British on the basis of its 
important strategic value as an East-West trading port (Rahman 1997). During the ensuing Gulf 
War, the lip-service that Saddam had paid to democratization in the 1980s were promptly 
sidelined and the first anniversary of the Gulf War gave Al-Qadisiyya ample opportunity to 
attack the United States for having misunderstood Iraq’s rich history, complex culture and 
                                                 
7 As translated in Bengio’s Saddam’s Word (Bengio 1998: 62). 
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unique politics. It asserted that ‘We have Saddam Hussein and they have their democracy … Let 
them enjoy their democracy … but we are content to have an Arab leader, a Muslim seeker of 
justice’ (Al-Qadisiyya 1992).8 
Immediately following the first Gulf War, the Baath came under intense pressure, both 
from the heavy international sanctions placed upon it by the international community and by a 
number of internal rebellions which posed a significant challenge to the embattled and 
weakened regime. As will be discussed later in this chapter, in the north the Kurds mounted a 
Rapareen (‘Uprising’, in Kurdish) while in the south the Shia launched a parallel Intifada 
(‘Uprising’, in Arabic) of their own. In response to these rebellions, Saddam wrote and 
published a series of seven articles that appeared in Al-Thawra between April 3 and 14, 1991. 
The articles included discussions of Shia and Kurdish roles within Iraqi society and directly 
addressed some of their grievances. He was forced, for the first time, to acknowledge and 
confront Iraq’s ethnic diversity and to discuss it in an open and public fashion; he was also 
forced to make at least token references to the need for democracy and dialogue. In Eric Davis’ 
extended discussion of these articles he points out that 
A significant, albeit implicit, admission in the articles is that Iraq is 
characterized by an authoritarian and repressive state. Saddam justifies this 
authoritarianism by arguing that any nation-state undergoing a material and 
cultural renaissance must pass through a transitional period characterized by 
violence and ill-defined citizen rights. According to Saddam, Western 
countries confronted this situation during their own development into 
prosperous and stable nation-states. (Davis 2005b: 245) 
The implications of such admissions were remarkable. For the first time, Saddam not only 
acknowledged various problems within Iraq, but also admitted that the Baathist state was not the 
ultimate form of Iraqi government. Instead, the Baath were a necessary – if chaotic, 
authoritarian and repressive – stage of transition towards a more open and tolerant society. Iraq 
                                                 
8 As translated in Bengio’s Saddam’s Word (Bengio 1998: 69). 
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was not yet a stable and robust nation and to get there, Iraqis were encouraged to continue the 
struggle for liberty, equality and democracy. 
 Despite such promising rhetoric, Saddam sought to tighten his grip on the Iraqi media 
by promoting his eldest son, Udday Hussein, to the position of the Head of the Iraqi Journalists’ 
Union,9 leaving him responsible for the censorship and management of most of the nation’s 
media (Daragahi 2003: 47). Specifically, there were six official daily newspapers which all 
came under the jurisdiction of the newly appointed Udday: Al-Jumhuriya, Al-Thawra, The 
Baghdad Observer, the military paper Al-Qadisiyya, Al-Iraq (‘The Iraq’, a renamed version of 
the earlier Kurdish run newspaper, Al-Taakhi), and Udday Hussein’s own personal paper Babil 
which was established in 1990. Udday’s influence also extended over several official weekly 
papers and radio stations, as well as a handful of television channels, all of which were tightly 
controlled by the state (Hooglund 1990: 199–200, Hurrat and Leidig 1994: 98–9, Rugh 1979: 
32, 2004: 30).10 The result of having his son in such a prestigious position was that Saddam 
could continue to manipulate the media at will. 
In 1995, once again under increasing domestic pressure to democratize, Saddam 
conducted Iraq’s first Presidential elections since the revolution of 1958. Only one candidate, 
Saddam Hussein, stood for election, however, and the poll took the form of a nation-wide 
referendum in which his constituents were asked the simple question: ‘Do you agree that 
Saddam Hussein should be the president of the Republic of Iraq for another seven years?’ (cited 
in Y. M. Ibrahim 1995). As with earlier elections, these were little more than a cursory nod to 
democracy, a carefully constructed mask designed to obfuscate growing Baathist 
                                                 
9  In 2000, the Iraqi Journalists’ Union awarded Udday Hussein the rather suspect honour of ‘Journalist of the 
Century’ (Tabor 2002). 
10 It should be noted here that, although Udday took control of most of Iraq’s media in the 1990s, the result of the 
international sanctions against Iraq meant that much of it eroded dramatically. This is especially true of newspapers, 
with their quality dropping both in terms of journalistic style, the number of pages and even the paper on which they 
were printed. 
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authoritarianism. The campaign involved endless glorification of Saddam and, although he 
never appeared publicly prior to the election, he paid an army of supporters to march through 
the streets declaring ‘Na’am, Na’am, Saddam’ (‘Yes, Yes, Saddam’) (cited in Y. M. Ibrahim 
1995). On election day, Baathist loyalists rounded up and drove voters directly to the polling 
booths that were themselves covered in colourful pro-Saddam propaganda. Saddam won 
99.96% of the 8.4 million votes cast. Immediately after the elections, Iraqi state television 
screened a grand ceremony in which the triumphant leader was sworn in for another term. The 
Baath party celebrated the victory, with the Deputy Leader of the Revolutionary Command 
Council, Izzat Ibrahim declaring: 
It is an immortal day in the history of Arabism and Islam … It is a blow to the 
states that have harboured enmity toward Iraq and raised unjustified doubts 
about the legitimacy of its regime or the right of its people to choose the form 
of government they like. (Ibrahim cited in New York Times 1995) 
Following the events of September 11 and the onset of the ‘War on Terror’, Saddam staged 
another sham Iraqi election in 2002, this time trumping his own personal best and winning 
100% of the vote. Here, New York Times journalist John F. Burns reported on a number of 
‘small but remarkable’ protests that broke out across Baghdad. He claimed that the protests 
were ‘the most visible sign of a new and potentially seismic trend: a willingness among ordinary 
people to speak up’ (Burns 2002). Despite this, the official state media welcomed the result: Al-
Thawra claimed it as a sure sign of Iraqi unity behind the authority of their leader (Al-Thawra 
2002); Iraq Daily claimed it a better example of democracy than the bungled 2001 US election 
which brought President Bush to power (Iraq Daily 2002); while one journalist at Babil opined 
that ‘this pure and mature democratic practice in a besieged country, which is exposed to 
aggression every day, is the best proof of the ability, vitality and courage of this people’ (Babil 
2002). 
Along these same lines, the official Iraqi press continued in its absolute and unwavering 
support for Saddam in the lead up to the Iraq War of 2003. When, in 2002, President Bush 
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offered Saddam the ultimatum of complying with UN weapons inspectors or facing the 
consequences, Al-Thawra accused Bush of exploiting ‘the international body as a tool serving 
and giving legitimacy to his aggressive schemes against Iraq’ (Al-Thawra 2002). The invective 
continued as the war got closer. In January 2003, Al-Iraq claimed that the ‘Zionists Rumsfeld, 
Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice’ were ‘stupidly and arrogantly continu[ing] to make 
statements they have learned off by heart’ (Al-Iraq 2003c). When Bush issued Saddam with his 
final ultimatum on 17 March 2003, commentators on Iraqi TV taunted the US President, calling 
him an ‘idiot,’ a ‘failure’ and ‘foolish’, and critiquing his speech as being premised on ‘false 
assumptions’ and an ‘incoherent argument’ (Iraq TV 2003a). 
During the combat phase of the war itself, the state-run Iraqi media used a variety of 
rhetorical techniques to garner wide support for the Iraqi army, to instil confidence in the 
populace and to undermine the coalition troops. These included: converting the conflict into a 
religious war and emphasizing that the Iraqi people were protected by God; invoking history to 
illustrate the wonders of Iraqi civilization and its ability to withstand attacks from invading 
forces; constructing the war in true ABSP fashion as a ‘people’s war’ and claiming that the Iraqi 
forces were not only ready for the coalition forces but that they would turn the invasion into a 
blood-bath despite the odds (Al-Iraq 2003b, Al-Thawra 2003, Iraq TV 2003b, 2003c). One 
particularly scathing article in Al-Iraq drew parallels between the looming US invasion and that 
of the British nearly a century earlier. It blamed the British for 
deceiving the Arabs and exploiting their revolution against the Ottoman 
empire, after promising them help to free their lands and set up a unified Arab 
state … Britain, instead, issued an ill-fated document providing for the 
fragmentation of the Arab homeland into small states under a British mandate 
… history shows that in Iraq, tyrants and Colonialists dug their own graves … 
Our historic witness is the graves of the English Colonialists. Does the meek 
lackey [UK Prime Minister Tony] Blair remember this, in order to bring it 
back to the mind of his master Little Bush, at a time when they are tasting 
defeat at the hands of the Iraqis. (Al-Iraq 2003a) 
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Despite such bravado, by the end of March most of the Iraqi media had begun to struggle under 
the constant bombing of their facilities. By early April, the Iraqi Satellite TV channel had 
ceased broadcasting, but many of Iraq’s domestic TV and radio stations remained on air, 
playing patriotic music and broadcasting religious sermons, images of people chanting pro-
Saddam slogans and extracts from speeches by Saddam Hussein and other senior Baath 
members. Finally, with the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003, Saddam Hussein’s reign over Iraq 
came to an end, the last of his loyal media now silenced as the coalition forces toppled his statue 
in Firdos square and took control of the country. 
Counter Discourse and Clandestine Opposition 
At the official level, Saddam’s leadership effectively eroded much of Iraq’s long established 
civil society. The ranks of the nation’s numerous opposition movements began to thin as strict 
punishments, including execution, were handed out to those affiliated with political parties other 
than the ABSP. The Baathist state also utilized the media not only to promote and maintain its 
incumbency but to generate a complex matrix of discourses that served to obfuscate state 
tyranny. Despite their control and manipulation of the nation’s media sector, most Iraqis 
remained cynically aware of state doctrine and learned to maintain a veneer of Baathist loyalty 
while either ‘reading between the lines’ or rejecting outright the propaganda they were so 
routinely fed. Further, the years of ABSP hegemony also saw various ethnic and religious 
political factions begin to gather momentum. While Saddam’s regime can be seen to have been 
both brutal and despotic, there was also a strong culture of clandestine dissent and opposition. A 
variety of counter-discourses emerged, characterized by diverse debates, passionate critiques of 
the regime and the advocacy of a more open and democratic Iraq. 
Perhaps the most subtle and nuanced of these counter discourses emanated from within 
Iraq. Despite the fact that many Iraqi academics, journalists, artists and poets were 
commandeered by the state to write about and promote Baathist ideology, some managed to 
utilize subtle imagery, clever analogies, allegory or double entendres to expose the authoritarian 
and repressive culture of the Baath and force their fellow Iraqis to ponder alternatives such as 
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democratic rule. This was especially true in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War when articles 
began to appear in papers such as Al-Iraq and Al-Qadisiyya which delicately but deliberately 
criticized life under Saddam, postulated on the merits of democratic governance, and called for 
free and fair elections (Al-Iraq 1989c, Al-Jumhuriyya 1980). In the mid- to late-1980s articles 
by Iraqi scholar and neo-Marxist, Aziz Al-Sayyid Jassim attacked the Baathist bureaucracy and 
the sham heroes and revolutionaries it had brought to the fore, sowing the seeds of dissent (Al-
Musawi 2006: 85–7). Another Iraqi writer and critic, Muhammad Mubrarak, went as far as 
arguing that the Hadith ‘Differing opinions among my nation are a grace [of God]’ should 
become the epithet of all those who wanted to ‘build a genuine democracy’ in Iraq (Al-Iraq 
1989a). Other journalists at Al-Iraq argued that democracy was ‘vital for the progress of the 
people and for establishing law and justice in their midst’ (Al-Iraq 1989b). While Al-Qadisiyya 
maintained that ‘only backward peoples were afraid of freedom; not so the Iraqis, who were 
entitled to full democratic freedom’ (Al-Qadisiyya 1989: 5).11 
In the 1990s, following the defeat of Iraq in Kuwait, some journalists began to push the 
envelope even further. At Nab Al-Shabab (‘The Youth’), the weekly Udday-controlled 
newspaper of the Youth Union, journalists got away with candidly criticising Deputy Prime 
Minister Tariq Aziz and promoting opposition figures such as Ahmad Chalabi. As one writer for 
the paper, Mohamed Bedewi Al-Shamari, commented years later, ‘We criticized the 
government’s behaviour … We criticized the checkpoints, the limited freedoms of the people, 
the actions of the Baathist security officers. We called on the government to respect the people’s 
rights’ (Al-Shamari cited in Daragahi 2003: 47). 
Aside from the subtle critiques offered by journalists working for the state, the Baathist 
period also saw the emergence and strengthening of various political parties from across the vast 
number of religious and ethnic divides. For example, the Kurds were politically active in Iraq 
from as early as 1946 when famed guerrilla leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani established the first 
                                                 
11 These translations are taken from Bengio’s Saddam’s Word (Bengio 1998: 39-40, 62-4). 
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Iraqi political party based purely on ethnicity: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
(Stansfield 2003: 66–7). It was not until 1970 that the Kurds were able to gain semi-autonomy 
from the Baathist government, however, and in 1974 the Baath passed an autonomy law which 
would see the region governed by an elected legislative council (McDowell 2000 [1996]: 327–
37). Realising that the law would set a dangerous precedent by allowing free and fair elections 
in Iraq, the Baath quickly amended it to clarify that the elections were in fact nominations, to be 
held under full Baathist supervision with all candidates to be approved by the central 
government. During the early 1970s, the KDP mouthpiece, Al-Taakhi (‘Brotherhood’), wrote 
critically on several social and political topics making it understandably popular across Iraq. Al-
Taakhi was especially vocal when it came to Kurdish nationalism, arguing that ‘The Kurdish 
movement in Iraq is the movement of Kurds anywhere. It is a national movement, not any 
different from the national movements of other peoples’ (Al-Taakhi 1972).12 Such rhetoric put 
the Baath in the uncomfortable position of having to enter debates they would normally choose 
to avoid and they frequently used their own newspapers to rebuke and rebuff the rebellious 
northern Kurds. 
When the KDP was defeated by the Iraqi army in 1975, the left-leaning urban members 
of the party had formed their own political organization, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
with Jalal Talabani13 as their leader. However, the KDP quickly re-grouped under the leadership 
of Barzani’s son, Massoud Barzani 14  and the rivalry between the two factions re-ignited 
(Stansfield 2007: 67–8, 79–86). During the Iran-Iraq War, the Kurds were caught in the cross-
fire with Iran supplying sporadic military assistance and, by 1987, the Kurds again controlled 
much of northern Iraq. The Baath, fearing the re-emergence of an autonomous Kurdish region, 
waged a brutal attack on Kurdistan known as the Al-Anfal (‘The Spoils of War’). The campaign 
                                                 
12 This translation is taken from Bengio’s Saddam’s Word (Bengio 1998: 116). 
13 Jalal Talabani remains the leader of the PUK today and also serves as the State President of Iraq. 
14 Today, Massoud Barzani is both the President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and he remains the 
leader of the KDP. 
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saw an estimated 100,000 non-combatant Kurds killed, including, in 1988, Saddam’s infamous 
authorization of the use of chemical weapons for the purpose of genocide, killing some 5,000 
Kurdish civilians and maiming a further 7,000 in Halabja (Rose and Baravi 1998). Despite such 
egregious acts, the resolve of the Kurds remained strong and, when Iraq was defeated in Kuwait 
in 1991, the Kurds waged a Rapareen (‘Uprising’ in Kurdish) against the central government 
that resulted in many Kurdish deaths but also gave the people limited autonomy within the Iraqi 
state (Tripp 2000: 253–9). This newfound autonomy brought with it several elections, an 
independent parliament and the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in 
1992 (Anderson and Stansfield 2004: 155–83). 
The following era in Kurdish history – from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 to the Iraq 
War of 2003 – saw Iraqi Kurdistan not only wrest autonomy from the central ABSP 
government, but also develop a significantly active public sphere. The region was home to a 
gamut of non-official political parties aside from the KDP and PUK including the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Toilers Party, the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party and the Communist Party of 
Iraqi Kurdistan. All of these parties controlled their own partisan media outlets and the media 
landscape swelled to include approximately 200 newspapers and magazines, two satellite TV 
stations, 20 local TV stations and 10 Radio stations. These media outlets, ranging from the 
sophisticated efforts of the KDP and PUK through to the tawdry ventures of smaller parties, 
were not only highly critical of Saddam and his Baghdad-based government, but also often 
asserted an alternate vision of Iraq that advocated democracy. Foremost among these were the 
newspapers Brayati (‘Fraternity’, run by the KDP), Al-Ittihad (‘The United’, PUK) and the 
regions first independent newspaper, Hawlati (‘Citizen’), which was widely esteemed for its 
objectivity and for its unreserved criticism of various Kurdish authority figures (Osman 2002). 
Iraqi Kurds also enjoyed unfettered access to satellite TV, while internet access was readily 
available at the region’s three university campuses and the many internet cafés that dotted the 
cities. Collectively, the Kurdish public sphere from 1991 onwards was relatively free to debate 
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Kurdish issues, to promote Kurdish history and culture, and to foster various civil society 
movements. 
Despite the fact they have always been the majority in modern Iraq, the Shia have long 
been marginalized by the central Sunni-led government and consequently produced a number of 
active opposition movements. This arguably began with something of a Shia political 
renaissance that occurred in Iraq around the 1950s under the leadership of Grand Ayatollah 
Muhammad Baqr Al-Sadr who founded the enormously popular Hizb Al-Dawah Islamiyya 
(‘The Islamic Calling’, or more commonly referred to as Dawah, the ‘Calling’)15 in 1957. 
Although Baqr Al-Sadr called for the establishment of an Islamic Republic, his vision was of a 
state ruled not by clerics, but by the combination of Shariah (Islamic law) and Shura 
(consultation), an important distinction which has long divided many Iraqi Shia scholars from 
their contemporaries in Iran (Abdul-Jabar 2002, Litvak 1998, Nakash 2003 [1994]). This line of 
thinking was to have a substantial impact on the Shia politics of the second half of the twentieth 
century. For its part, Dawah repeatedly challenged the central government, with several 
assassination attempts on Saddam Hussein and other senior ABSP members. Saddam banned 
the organization and, in 1980, he ordered the arrest, torture and execution of Baqr Al-Sadr for 
having supported the Shia-led Islamic Revolution in Iran (Anderson and Stansfield 2004: 124–
7). 
The persecution of Dawah by the Baathist state had several important consequences for 
Shia politics in Iraq, all of which have become very significant in the politics of the Re-Colonial 
era. During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, many senior members of the party fled to Tehran 
and in 1982 formed the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)16 under the 
                                                 
15 The Dawah party is currently led by former Iraqi Prime Minister, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari and its Secretary-General, 
Nuri Al-Maliki, is also the current Prime Minister of Iraq. 
16 The SCIRI changed its name to the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in 2007 and is currently led by Sayyid 
Ammar Al-Hakim. Due to the fact that this study mostly concerns the period prior to the name change of SCIRI to 
SIIC, the party will be referred to as SCIRI throughout.  
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leadership of senior Iraqi cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Bakir Al-Hakim (Baram 1998: 52). 
From the safety of Iran, SCIRI was free to express their grievances with Saddam, setting up a 
number of radio stations that broadcast into Iraq and which spoke directly to the Iraqi Shia 
population, advocating the overthrow of the secular Baathist regime. They also reasoned rightly 
that a more democratic order in Iraq would provide considerable power to the majority Shia 
population. 
As with the Kurds in the north, the southern Shia population also waged a considerable 
Intifada (‘Uprising’ in Arabic) at the conclusion of the Gulf War, beginning with a series of 
anti-Baathist demonstrations that saw several party members killed in Basra (Bengio 1992: 7–
8). Eventually, both the Dawah and SCIRI parties joined the fractured revolt and made the error 
of attempting to galvanize the mostly secular and leftist resistance behind their religious vision. 
This meant that the Shia uprising lost much of its initial impetus and when Saddam turned his 
forces against the rebels they were soon vanquished (Tripp 2000: 253–9). Nonetheless, both the 
SCIRI and Dawah parties continued to wield significant power across the Shia south. During the 
1990s, the Dawah movement continued under the authority of Baqr Al-Sadr’s brother-in-law, 
Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq Al-Sadr, a charismatic and militant leader who sought to 
revitalize the Shia and engage them in political agitation against the state. Saddam reacted 
predictably and had Sadiq Al-Sadr assassinated in 1999 (Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sanchez, and 
Sayej 2010: 317). Meanwhile SCIRI continued in Iran under the leadership of Hakim whose 
writings on democracy qualified SCIRI as a legitimate part of the US approved ‘democratic 
opposition’. A statement issued by the Ayatollah in May 2001 demanded ‘the humanitarian and 
legal rights for all Iraqi people … those rights that the regime has confiscated without 
distinguishing between the Sunnis and Shiites, and between Arabs and Turkomen, for the 
regime has usurped all the rights of the Iraqi people’ (Al-Hakim 2001: 319). 
In addition to the writings of these key religious figures, throughout the 1990s and in the 
lead up to the 2003 invasion, a number of expatriate Iraqi Shia began calling attention to the 
widespread suffering of their brothers and sisters in Iraq, especially in the wake of the massacre 
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that followed the intifada of 1991. In July 2002 three prominent Shia expatriates, Mowaffaq Al-
Rubaie, Ali Allawi and Shaib Al-Hakim, penned a manifesto entitled the ‘Declaration of the 
Shia of Iraq’ which states: 
Iraq’s political crisis … is entirely due to the conduct of an overtly sectarian 
authority determined to pursue a policy of discrimination solely for its own 
interests of control, a policy that has ultimately led to the total absence of 
political and cultural liberties and the worse forms of dictatorship. (Al-Rubaie, 
Allawi, and Al-Hakim 2002: 313–4) 
It goes on to argue that ‘the sectarian issue in Iraq will not be solved by the imposition of a 
vengeful Shia sectarianism on the state and society’ and articulates the Shia’s firm commitment 
to national unity and aversion to the creation of a separate Shia state (Al-Rubaie, et al. 2002: 
314). Their demands included: ‘The abolition of dictatorship and its replacement with 
democracy’, the ‘Creation of a democratic parliamentary constitutional order’ with ‘Full respect 
for the national, ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities of all Iraqis,’ and the ‘Reconstruction 
of, and support for, the main elements of a civil society’ (Al-Rubaie, et al. 2002: 315). 
Opposition to Saddam’s leadership was not limited to those who resisted him on the basis 
of their Kurdish ethnicity or Shia religiosity. Many of the dissident ex-Baathists and members of 
the armed forces began to form various opposition parties of their own, many of which were 
backed by the US and UK. These include the Al-Wifaq Al-Watani Al-Iraqi (‘The Iraqi National 
Accord’ or INA), founded in 1991 and headed by Dr Iyad Allawi17 and the Iraqi National 
Congress (INC), founded in 1992 and led by Dr Ahmed Chalabi. 18  Both of these parties 
controlled a handful of media which issued blatant anti-Saddam, pro-democracy propaganda. 
                                                 
17 Allawi was a member of the US-installed Iraqi Interim Governing Council from 2003 and later served as Interim 
Prime Minister from June 2004 until April 2005. More recently, Allawi’s secular nationalist Al-Iraqiyya list won the 
most seats in Iraq’s 2010 elections but he was not able to form a government. 
18 Chalabi supplied suspect information to the Bush administration regarding Iraq’s alleged stockpile of WMD (J. 
Klein 2005: 25). He later served as Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister throughout much of 2005, but failed to win a single 
seat following the December 2005 election. 
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They sought to give a common voice to Iraq’s divergent opposition groups, to erode Saddam’s 
support from within Iraq, to promote alternative heads of state (Allawi or Chalabi), to work in 
the favour of US regional interests and to mobilize dissent against the incumbent regime. Their 
central platform was to usurp the regime and establish respect for ‘human rights and rule of law 
within a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq’ (Katzman 2000: 2). They both waged a 
number of successful terrorist attacks on the ABSP before Saddam reacted by having several 
senior members executed and by all but crushing the rebellion (Baram 1998: 55–7, Stansfield 
2007: 145–8). 
On a smaller scale, throughout the Baathist period, the once powerful ICP continued to 
publish their newspaper Tariq Al-Shab (‘The Way of the People’) and their theoretical journal 
Al-Thaqafa Al-Jadida (‘The New Culture’). These newspapers enabled them to be very critical 
of the regime, even criticizing it for the ‘total lack of democratic freedom within Iraq’ (Salucci 
2005: 61). Several important pieces appeared in Al-Thaqafa Al-Jadida in 1992, including one by 
Ali Ibrahim which argued that, for Iraqis, democracy was no longer ‘an abstract term but a 
specific political structure expressed in a supremacy of the law, a multi-party system, 
parliamentary life and organization, press and party freedoms’ (A. Ibrahim 1992: 17). For Sad 
Salih, democracy was central to the ICP’s broader agenda of ‘mobilizing the mutual cooperation 
among the party’s political, cultural and popular organizations in the Arab world for the cause 
of democracy and the respect of human rights’ (Salih 1992: 20). Lutfi Hatim agreed; for him 
‘democracy should be the most important component of the Party’ and 
When the time comes, the pragmatic position of the Iraqi Communist Party 
today will give the Iraqi democratic movement the position of being an active 
Arab force for the creation of a democratic Arab solidarity which will restore 
self-confidence to the Arab citizen … and which will increase the demand for 
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democratic rule and peace, based on the rejection of military aggression, 
respect of neighbours, and destruction of military bases. (Hatim 1992: 74)19 
There is a final category of counter discourse that was critical in resisting and critiquing 
the Baathist regime, that from among the large expatriate Iraqi community. While this is not the 
place for a thorough discussion of the varying locations and complex politics of the Iraqi 
Diaspora, it is worth mentioning that many of Iraq’s most noted activists, poets, writers, artists 
and intellectuals fled Iraq during the Baathist epoch. From the safety of exile, they found new 
and larger audiences within Iraq, across the Arab world and among the international 
community. They felt free to criticize Saddam and to advocate democracy and a whole 
collection of cross-sectarian, cross-political and cross-religious political opinions emerged. 
Arguably the epicentre of Iraqi dissident opposition was London, where several important 
expatriate papers were produced including the organ of the Union of Iraqi Democrats, Al-
Dimuqrati (‘The Democracy’) and the Shia-run Al-Tayyar Al-Jadid (‘The New Movement’). 
Another important paper was the highly esteemed independent pan-Arab daily, Azzaman (‘The 
Times’) which was founded in London in 1997 by Saad Bazzaz20 and quickly grew to include 
international editions issued from Bahrain and North Africa (Zengerle 2002). Many Iraqi 
expatriates and dissidents also chose to write for other journals such as the London-based Pan-
Arab daily of record, Al-Hayat (‘The Life’). In the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, many Iraqis spoke with renewed confidence about the tyranny of the Baath and began to 
discuss the options facing the nation beyond his oppression. One such Iraqi writer, Jabbar 
Yassin, felt free enough to air his grievances with the ‘bloody political machine’ of Saddam 
Hussein and ‘the cultural genocide being carried out in Iraq’ (Yassin 2002). He also raised 
                                                 
19 The translations of Al-Thaqafa Al-Jadida found in this paragraph are from Tareq Ismael’s The Rise and Fall of the 
Communist Party of Iraq (Ismael 2008: 279-80). 
20 Saad Bazzaz is the former editor of the Baathist Al-Jumhuriyya and later he was the manager of the Iraqi National 
News Agency and the Ministry of Information, overseeing the production and broadcasting of all Iraqi radio and 
television (Zengerle 2002). 
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pertinent questions about the future of Iraq and the role of Iraqi intellectuals in the formation of 
‘a republic of tolerance’ (Yassin 2002). Another Iraqi dissident, Bahr Al Uloom claimed that the 
re-building of Iraq from the ruins of the Baath regime would require a robust and egalitarian 
democracy premised on a constitution that included respect and rights for all of Iraq’s diverse 
peoples, free and fair elections, and the adoption of an appropriate legislative and constitutional 
framework. He concluded by stating that, while all Iraqis have common interest in seeing ‘the 
demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the establish[ment of] a democratic system’, it is Iraqis 
which ‘hold the ultimate responsibility for building their own country’ (Al-Uloom 2002). 
One particularly prominent Iraqi expatriate was Ghassan Al-Atiyyah who had once 
served as a Professor of Politics at Baghdad University and had worked for the United Nations. 
From London, he published the Malaf Al-Iraqi (‘Iraq File’) and wrote several articles for Al-
Hayat as well as Middle Eastern English-language papers such as Beirut’s The Daily Star. In 
one such article, Al-Atiyyah advocated ‘democratic change’ in Iraq and openly discussed the 
‘choosing of a post-Saddam regime’ which would bring about a ‘pro-Western and democratic 
Iraq’ (Al-Atiyyah 2002b). In another article, Al-Atiyyah engages with broader questions about 
Arab democracy arguing that the central problem with it is 
the way Western powers dealt with the region [they directly] cultivated and 
consolidated undemocratic practices. This not only took place during the 
Colonial era, but continued even after the Arab states gained independence, 
when Britain and the United States – the two most influential global players in 
the Middle East – made fighting communism their number one priority in the 
region, at the expense of democracy. (Al-Atiyyah 2002a) 
In another critical article he poses the question, ‘What would Iraq be like without Saddam?’. He 
then moves forward to lambast the Iraqi opposition for its petty divides and rivalries arguing 
‘that it is precisely because there is no common vision of what a post-Saddam Iraq should look 
like that the current regime has been able to survive so long’ (Al-Atiyyah 2002c). He adds that 
Iraq’s political elites have routinely marginalized the will of ordinary Iraqis in favour of 
prioritizing their own agenda, that they have failed to draft an appropriate and liberal political 
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framework for post-Saddam Iraq, and that their shortcomings may well pave the way for a new 
military dictatorship to rise from the ashes of the Baathist era. His searing indictment of Iraqi 
opposition politics and his insight into the looming political melee in Iraq beyond the US 
invasion conclude with words that ring painfully true a decade later: 
Achieving democracy requires a readiness to compromise and an acceptance 
of wide participation. There is an opportunity today for creating a democratic 
future for Iraq. But this will require that senior opposition figures demonstrate 
leadership … Waiting for America to establish democracy in Iraq on behalf of 
the opposition is a dangerous gamble. America wants to have an effective and 
stable government in power in Baghdad that doesn’t threaten its neighbours. 
Democracy is not an American priority. (Al-Atiyyah 2002c) 
Conclusion 
In discussing Post-Colonial Iraq it is important to note that, despite the withdrawal of the British 
and the usurpation of the Hashemite monarchy, Iraq did not emerge as a genuine democracy 
with legitimate opposition parties, a functioning parliament and a free press. While many of 
Iraq’s Post-Colonial regimes promised such institutions, these were generally empty promises 
designed to gain political advantage rather than broaden participation. Similarly, Iraq’s media 
industry, so often used for authoritarian purposes, served more as the duty-bound propaganda 
machine of each ensuing regime than the watchdog of a functioning democracy. There can be 
no defending the hegemony of Arif, Bakr or Saddam, each of whom, in their own way, brought 
Iraq closer to models of governance aligned with notions of Oriental despotism. 
Of all Iraq’s Post-Colonial regimes, the Baath was the most adept at manipulating the 
national discourses of democracy to their advantage. By doing so, however, Saddam effectively 
created the environ in which a wide range of subversive and clandestine political movements 
emerged both within and outside Iraq. It is important not to over-determine the extent to which 
these various opposition groups were democratic by any definition of the term. Similarly, it 
cannot be ignored that certain Shia, Kurdish and other political parties have proven themselves 
very capable of utilizing the rhetoric and institutions of democracy in their own quests for 
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power (especially since 2003, see the following chapter). Nonetheless, at the very least this 
complex web of oppositional politics and their respective media outlets indicates that, to 
paraphrase Foucault, a complex matrix of intersecting discourses arose in opposition to the 
centralized power structures and constructed knowledge of the dominant episteme (Foucault 
2005 [1969]). Whether premised on ethnicity, religiosity or political dissent, these opposition 
movements constituted a lively public sphere that asserted alternative visions of a democratic 
Iraqi state. 
 
